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Gary W Cox and Scott Morgenstern Reactive Legislatures and Proactive Presidents: Latin American Variations on the Theme
This article focuses on variation within the broad category of reactive legislatures. Assemblies and presidents in Latin America are engaged in one or another of a distinctive subfamily of bilateral veto games. In games of this subfamily the policy process is asymmetric, in that (for the most part) only the president proposes. The sequence of moves in the statutory process is typically as follows. First, the president proposes one or more new policies (bills); second, the legislature either accepts, amends, or rejects the president's proposals; third, if the legislature amends or rejects (some of) his proposals, the president can either bargain, take unilateral action, or seek to undermine the assembly's ability to veto proposals. By bargaining, we mean that the president makes actual concessions in proposed policies in order to gain legislative acquiescence or "buys" votes with pork and patronage. By unilateral action, we mean that the president emits decrees, uses the rule-making authority of the bureaucracy, or uses other unilateral powers to implement as much of his desired policies as possible. By undermining the assembly's independence, we mean that the president seeks to win the next legislative election (by fair or foul means) or control the career paths of assembly members.
In the following analysis we shall simplify matters by imagining that the president anticipates one of four legislative types and pursues a strategy that is optimal in light of such a legislature's likely responses to his initiatives. Specifically, the president anticipates that the majority in the assembly will be either recalcitrant, workable, parochial-venal, or subservient. Recalcitrant majorities (very low percentages of members supporting the president) will reject essentially all the proposals the president really wants. Subservient majorities (very high percentages of members thoroughly beholden to the president) will accept essentially any proposal the president makes. Between these extremes of support the president can face two types of more manageable majorities, one that demands a seat at the policy table (workable) and another that is willing to concede policy issues in exchange for access to pork or other resources (parochial-venal). Depending on which sort of assembly the president anticipates, he will undertake different strategies and use different institutional powers to implement the strategies. That is, strategy and tactics will oscillate with legislative type.
The two primary sources of a legislature's type are the percentage of the legislature's seats occupied by members supporting the president and the percentage of the legislature's seats occupied by members with largely parochial interests (who see their careers as continuing at a local level and their duties as primarily the protection of local prerogatives). We view both of these variables as exogenous or predetermined factors that the president can not change in the short term but which materially affect the legislature's likely response to presidential initiatives. We do not wish to say that, once a legislature is elected and these two percentages are fixed, the legislature never varies its strategy. But the legislature's type is a good enough clue to its likely strategy for presidents to act as "Stackleberg leaders," initiating legislation with a clear notion and in light of the legislature's likely response. 5 The two extreme legislative types-subservient and recalcitrant-are easily explained by variations in the level of allegiance or opposition to the president. But why does a legislature move from a parochial to a policy orientation?
Variance in legislators' career ambitions is an important part of the answer. Legislators in Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil, where respectively 0, 20, and 35 percent of legislators were reelected in recent elections, should be looking to grab what they can and run.6 Legislators with a low rate of reelection should be particularly responsive to presidents (or others) who control resources that the legislators can use to line their pockets, improve their future career prospects, or pay off their patrons. While certainly interested in the electoral benefits of the pork barrel, legislators who envision longer legislative careers (for example, in Chile, where about 70 percent of lower house members generally are reelected and another 10-15 percent run for the Senate) should also be worried about policy outcomes. This concern can be electorally motivated; since elections turn on a combination of candidate qualities and policy, legislators interested in reelection should involve themselves in the policy process. 7 Another variable influencing whether a legislature is parochial or policy-oriented is partisan ideology. Strong ideological parties should be less venal than a diverse coalition of politicians seeking fame, fortune, and power. Again, Chilean parties are distinctive. On the center-left, the two post-dictatorship Chilean presidents have enjoyed support of a coalition banded together for its strong opposition to Pinochet. The Chilean right, alternatively, is strongly associated with Pinochet and his regime. One of the two main rightist parties, the UDI, is intensely ideological. Many of its legislators were mayors during the Pinochet regime, and many were personally trained by a charismatic and rabidly anticommunist recent martyr (Jaime Guzman). UDI party members are unlikely to bend on crucial policy issues for an extra bridge in their district.
In contrast, presidents in Argentina and Brazil are neither supported nor opposed by such ideologically driven and organized parties. In neither of these countries has any single party or group of parties won the antiauthoritarian banner, and the PT in Brazil, which currently has only eleven percent of the legislative seats, is the only significant class-based party.8 The Peronists in Argentina had an ideological root based in their populist history, but Menem has effectively destroyed that party's legacy.
The Central Oscillation
The central oscillation in Latin American politics is the president's changing use of his constitutional and other powers in response to changes in anticipated assembly support. Latin American executives typically have greater powers of unilateral action than either U.S. presidents or European prime ministers, but they occupy an intermediate position as regards executive penetration of the legislative process within the assembly. This distinctive combination of institutional strengths, along two separate dimensions, leads to a distinctive oscillation in presidential strategy in response to variations in assembly types between use of the president's unilateral and integrative powers.
Changing Use of Unilateral Powers One way presidents change their strategies involves their unilateral powers. By unilateral powers we mean something close to what Carey and Shugart mean by proactive powers: powers that can be used without the concurrence of the legislature to change policy. 9 The clearest examples are constitutional decrees, but other sorts of decrees, regulatory rule making, and even vetoes can sometimes feature in pushing through a new policy.'0 When the president is politically weaker, he typically resorts more frequently to his unilateral powers; in contrast, when he is politically stronger, he resorts to these powers less often." This point can be illustrated by considering Collor, Menem, Frei, and Salinas. Collor, politically the weakest, pushed the limits of the constitutional powers of the Brazilian presidency. Menem had the putative support of the largest single party in the Argentine system, but, having reversed field on several key issues, he could not rely on consistent support. He too pushed the limits of his constitutionally defined powers, seeking only enough support in the assembly to prevent the override of his decrees. Frei, with a workable majority in Chile's lower house and a large minority in the upper house, avoided controversial use of his substantial unilateral powers. Finally, Salinas, presiding over the last years of a one party regime, could win passage of whatever statutes he wanted-as soon as the ducks were lined up within the PRI-and so did not need decrees, vetoes, or other unilateral tools used by presidents in more competitive systems. Everything could happen off-stage, with the formal procedures a pro forma ratification of decisions made elsewhere.
The logic behind this declining use of formal constitutional powers as the president's legislative support increases can be indicated by considering presidential strategy at three levels of assembly support: weak (the president faces a hostile majority in the assembly), medium (the president has a workable majority), and strong (the president has a large and subservient majority). When the president faces a hostile majority in the assembly, he will often have no chance of implementing his policy goals via statute. In these cases, his only recourse will be to take such unilateral action as he can manage, perhaps "pushing the envelope" of his powers in constitutionally provocative ways. When the president has a workable majority in the assembly, in contrast, he may be able to get his statutes passed with the aid of urgency provisions, the judicious allocation of cabinet positions to solidify legislative support, and a liberal distribution of pork. Since statutes can override conflicting decrees, are harder to overturn once enacted, and are constitutionally sounder instruments for many purposes, politically stronger presidents will more often prefer to pass statutes than to issue decrees. Finally, some presidents-for example, those in Taiwan and Mexico until recently-may be able to count on a large and subservient majority in the assembly. These presidents-who typically appear for an extended length of time only in authoritarian regimes-can routinely expect to get whatever statutes they want and hence have no political need to employ vetoes or decrees. They may occasionally find it convenient to use decrees or administrative rule-making powers rather than statutes, but they are not usually constrained in this choice by any lack of support in the assembly. The separation of powers has been overridden by the president's political strength, usually based on his ability to control candidate selection and elections to the assembly, the distribution of pork to members of the assembly, and the postassembly career prospects of sitting legislators.
Changing Use of Integrative Powers Latin American presidents are not confined to unilateral powers. They also deploy powers, such as urgency decrees and the appointment of ministers, that can help the president integrate himself into the legislative process of the assembly. As explained further below, integrative powers allow the president to set the policy agenda not just by sending proposals to congress, but also by prioritizing bills in the internal procedures of congress or by empowering assembly allies. Use of potentially integrative powers for actually integrative purposes responds to variations in presidential support in the assembly in precisely the opposite pattern to that noted above for unilateral powers: they are used more when the president is politically stronger, less when he is politically weaker. As this dimension of Latin American presidential power has received less attention, we shall say more about it below.12
Evidence That Use of Powers Varies with Assembly Support
Evidence that Latin American presidents vary their strategy in response to their prospects of support in the assembly and their institutional powers can be culled from the wealth of case studies on Latin America. The best currently available, systematic evidence is provided by Amorim-Neto in a study of seventy-five cabinets appointed by fiftyseven Latin American presidents from ten countries over the period 1946-95. According to Amorim-Neto's study, presidents who have decided to implement their policy goals via statute will lay the groundwork by appointing party leaders who can help solidify assembly support. In contrast, those who seek to rule by decree can pack their cabinets with cronies and technocrats. Amorim-Neto finds, among other things, that the percentage of partisan ministers in a president's cabinet increases as the percentage of seats held by the president's party in the assembly increases, and as the president's decree powers decline. In other words, presidents with a better political base in the assembly and with poorer institutional powers to pursue a unilateral strategy are more likely to seek to govern through, rather than around, the assembly.
A Typology of Presidents and Assemblies In sum, a president's level of support in the assembly will have a large impact on his overall policymaking strategy, whether to seek mostly a statutory implementation of goals (governing through the assembly) or a nonstatutory implementation (governing around the assembly). This overarching strategic decision about the optimal mix of statutory and nonstatutory effort in turn influences presidential tactics, which powers to use and how to use them. These tactics are also influenced by the president's institutional powers, and thus even presidents in similar circumstances could range from impotent to imperial, as a comparison between Collor and Mitterrand might show.
Four adjectives introduced above, familiar in descriptions of Latin (and North) American legislatures, encapsulate how presidents' strategies and tactics change with their anticipated level of assembly support: recalcitrant, workable, venalparochial, and subservient. The president has a rather clear best response to each of these types, and thus we match the four legislative adjectives with four presidential adjectives. First, if the president believes the assembly is recalcitrant-that it will reject most of his proposals and refuse to compromise-then (assuming he has unilateral powers at his disposal) his best strategy is to seek ways to get around the assembly veto by using his unilateral powers. This president is imperial. (If he lacks such powers, he would be impotent.) At the other end of the scale, where the president believes the assembly is subservient-that it will accept most of his proposals without the need of bargaining-his best strategy is to dictate terms. This president is dominant. The third and fourth types of presidents face workable majorities, and they bargain with legislative actors over the course of policy. These two types are divided by what the presidents offer legislators in return for their support. The types are therefore a function of the frequency with which the president uses four key bargaining chips: particularistic payoffs (pork and patronage), positional payoffs (ministerial portfolios), policy concessions, and agenda setting.
Where the president finds that his best response to a particular legislature is to buy support with pork and patronage, he is facing a venal or parochial assembly. These legislatures, maybe due to short legislative time horizons (low reelection rates) or career paths that reflect their pork-winning success, prefer the president to play a nationally oriented role, focusing on and taking the heat for national policy.13 Thus, in return for particularistic payoffs we expect these legislatures to offer (in a manner that is probably closer to abdication than delegation) the president broad authority over policy through grants of decree powers and to sponsor few important initiatives.
Assemblies that are involved in the policy process-in the sense that the president heads a coalition that includes assembly actors, seeks to implement coalitional policies via statutes, and designs the strategy to pass these statutes in consultation with his assembly allies-are workable. Their foil, the coalitional president, may also use particularistic payoffs to clinch deals, but pork will be used to get the last few votes needed to clinch deals, not as the main bargaining technique. The coalitional president thus makes more extensive use of his other three bargaining chips, all of which involve the assembly more intimately in actual policy decision making. Clearly, policy concessions bring the assembly into the policy process. But so do the allocation of ministerial portfolios to party leaders (these positions do not carry with them influence over pork alone) and the setting of the legislative agenda (over which the president has influence but can more effectively exercise control with the help of assembly actors).
The four pairs of corresponding (executive, legislative) types-imperial/recalcitrant, nationally oriented/parochial, coalitional/workable, and dominant/subservient-are displayed in Table 1 .14 Every imperial president has a recalcitrant congress as his antagonist; its actual or anticipated refusal to support his statutory initiatives drives him to use his unilateral powers. Every dominant president has a subservient congress that meekly acquiesces in most of his policies, typically because the president has previously established political dominance over the congress through control of nominations, elections, or postassembly career options. Finally, if the president believes that the assembly is workable, that it can be bargained with, then his best strategy depends on the most propitious bargaining mechanisms. If he is better off using his integrative powers to work through the statutory process, he is a coalitional president. If legislators are mostly after pork and the president can "buy" their support for his policies, then he is nationally oriented.'5 Outside of Mexico, the oscillation throughout the western hemisphere is mostly between imperial and coalitional presidencies, and so we shall focus on these types. We begin with the greater variability of presidential support in the assembly, the "engine" that drives variations in presidential strategy. We then consider the two sorts of institutional constraints discussed above, those having to do with the president's powers to penetrate the internal legislative process of the assembly and those that affect his powers to act unilaterally.
Variability in Presidential Support
Some indication that Latin American presidents experience greater variability in assembly support than their North American counterparts is given in Table 2. Table 2 is based mostly on Deheza's attempt to identify the coalitions supporting each president in a number of Latin American countries.16 Although one might have qualms about her numbers in particular cases, her work appears to be the best and most systematic available.'7 In six of the nine Latin American countries covered in Table 2 , the maximum assembly support for the president (observed over the period from the 1950s to the 1990s) is greater than the U.S. maximum; in seven of the nine cases, the minimum support is less than the U.S. minimum; and in eight of the nine cases, the standard deviation of presidential support in the assembly is greater than the U.S. figure. Thus, in most Latin American countries presidential support in the assembly varies more widely than it does in the U.S. The U.S. president does not have the right directly to determine the measures that congress will consider, to accelerate bills pending on congressional calendars, or otherwise to affect the legislative agenda. In contrast, Brazilian, Colombian, and Peruvian presidents can send to congress "urgent" bills that take precedence over every other legislative matter. In Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Uruguay presidential urgency powers are even greater: the president's bill automatically becomes law if congress does not formally reject it within a specified time period. Latin American presidents' powers of agenda setting pale in comparison to those of the typical prime minister, who disposes of votes of confidence and (sometimes) other effective agenda-setting techniques, but they are nonetheless substantially greater than the U.S. president's.
Thus, in terms of
All told, the separation of powers is much more thoroughgoing in the U.S. than it is in Latin America. The president can veto legislation, but he can not push legislation through the internal procedures of congress. At best, he can "go public" and apply external pressure.20 The U.S. congress's extraordinary abilities to initiate leg-islation have long been recognized. Less well recognized is the flip side of these abilities: the absence of executive powers to appoint legislators to the cabinet, initiate legislation, and control the congressional agenda.
In contrast, Latin American presidents can reach inside the assembly to appoint its members to his cabinet, directly propose bills, and accelerate their consideration. Thus, when a president has good prospects of legislative support, cabinets are constructed to maintain that support; initiative powers and urgency provisions are used in concert with coalition partners; and the president relates to the congress more as a prime minister relates to a parliament.21
Imperial Prerogatives When the president has little legislative support, however, cabinets are filled with cronies and technocrats; initiative powers and urgency provisions are used on an ad hoc basis; and the president relates to congress more as English monarchs used to relate to their parliaments. In the U.S., where congress regularly takes the legislative initiative, presidents with weak legislative supportthose facing divided government-make greater use of the veto power and more often attempt to implement policy without congressional authorization.22 A similar syndrome is visible in Latin America, but presidents there start with wider unilateral powers and seem prepared to push the envelope of constitutional action harder.
In addition to reactive powers such as the veto, presidents can also wield proactive or unilateral powers.23 First, presidents almost always have rule-making or interpretative authority. Second, many constitutions also allow the president wide authority to appoint ministers, judges, and other high officials, though their appointments often need congressional assent. Third, explicit legislative delegations of power to the executive expand many presidents' repertoire of action. In these cases, the legislature will generally set a specific task and timeline for the executive, retaining the right to review or change the president's decisions. Fourth, some presidents are constitutionally endowed with decree powers. These provisions can include the power to suspend civil liberties and other parts of the constitution in time of emergency, in addition to making policy via decree. Finally, there are what Carey and Shugart call "paraconstitutional" decree powers, which can allow the president to change laws by using the pen or sword.
While there are important exceptions, Latin American presidents have generally taken much more advantage of their delegated, constitutional, and paraconstitutional powers than have U.S. presidents.24 There are certainly cases of presidential unilateralism in the U.S., but presidents in Latin America regularly make policy decisions almost unilaterally. Presidents in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela have tremendous advantages in structuring the national budget, as the legislatures there are constitutionally restricted from making significant changes.25 Moreover, Latin American legislatures are hindered by a lack of time, resources, and experience. This combination of constitutional and orga-nizational limits has converted many Latin American presidents into virtual budget dictators. If we take into account paraconstitutional powers as well, we find even more presidential impositions. The Mexican president has frequently used his paraconstitutional powers to move funds among budget categories, remove irreverent governors, and impose tremendous policy shifts almost overnight (for example, nationalization and then reprivatization of the banks). In Argentina the limited delegation of power to President Alfonsin to deal with their economic crisis was later interpreted by Menem (and the courts) as an almost open-ended and very difficult to check power to decree whatever type of law Menem preferred not to send to the legislature. Similarly, Fujimori and Collor made extremely free use of decree powers.
Coalitional Presidents and Workable Assemblies
Both dominant and imperial presidents are familiar types. More novel is the characterization above of presidents with intermediate levels of political strength in the assembly. Given the appropriate institutional strengths, presidents with workable but not subservient majorities in the assembly can become what we have called coalitional presidents, integrating themselves into the legislative process of the assembly to a much greater degree than is typical in the U.S. The corresponding assembly type, which is brought into some degree of partnership in the policymaking process, we call workable.
The coalitional president and the workable assembly are important and understudied types. We know a lot about Latin American failures-the dominant presidents who have neutralized democratic checks and balances by virtue of their control over elections and the future career prospects of legislators and the imperial presidents who emerge from the dangerous combination of political weakness and institutional strength. But we know much less about how these systems work when presidents attempt to forge coalitions with assembly actors. While the other modalities may meet a minimal definition of democracy, they call into question the ideals of functioning checks and balances and limited executives. In comparison the coalitional/workable pairing is clearly more democratic. From the Restoration (1660) through the early decades of the nineteenth century, the House of Commons was constantly on guard against these royal tactics.35 To circumscribe the crown's ability to influence elections the Commons sought to regulate the power of dissolution, the conduct of elections, the right of peers and crown officials to vote or interfere in elections, and even the right of the crown to participate in the market for the sale and purchase of rotten boroughs. To circumscribe the crown's ability to "buy" its members, the Commons passed a long parade of "place bills," forbidding those who had accepted crown offices from sitting in the legislature (or requiring them to resign and submit to reelection).
Latin American Systems as Intermediate between Pure Presidentialism and
The king was not the only one actively seeking to redress the balance of the constitution in his favor. Ministers increasingly parlayed their role as conveyors of votes in the Commons, and their obligation to countersign all royal acts, into political dominance. The king fades increasingly from the political scene until, by the nineteenth century, premier-presidentialism had given way to pure parliamentarism.
The inherent tension in eighteenth century Britain's balanced constitution between leaders of the assembly (attempting to force their way into the ministry and to force the king to take their advice) and the king (attempting to control the assembly directly, so as to obviate the need to appoint assembly leaders as ministers) is similar to tensions observable in many Latin American cases. We may consider two examples, Mexico and Peru.
The Mexican president used the same basic strategy as the British king but succeeded where the king failed. As Weldon describes, both the electoral incentives of assembly members and their postassembly employment opportunities became increasingly dominated by the president until, eventually, an independent assembly ceased to exist. 36 The Peruvian constitution of 1933 seems to have attempted to recreate the British polity in the immediate aftermath of the Glorious Revolution. It required that all official acts be countersigned by a minister and that ministers resign if censured by the assembly; at the same time, it explicitly allowed ministers to sit in the assembly. These constitutional stipulations did not, however, lead to any noticeable movement toward parliamentarism in Peru. The reason, suggested by an acute analysis by Needler, seems to be precisely the failure of Peruvian legislative elites to mount effective defenses to Peruvian presidents' pursuit of the same two strategies pursued by the British king and Mexican president. 37 A key difference between most of Latin America and Britain is that civilian control of the military has not been established in the former but was in the latter. But the central civilian tension in the systems is similar. Moreover, one does not have to be too Whiggish to argue that the best outcomes for these systems entail either maintaining the balance between the executive and the legislative powers or redressing it in favor of the assembly (moving more toward premier-presidentialism).
Conclusion
Latin America's executive-legislative relations typically take the form of a constitutionally distinctive bilateral veto game in which the president moves first, proposing most of the important legislation, but knows that the assembly will then have a chance to react. First, although Latin American assemblies are primarily reactive, they are not necessarily impotent or unimportant. Presidents must anticipate what the assemblies will accept; thus legislators have influence through anticipated reactions. Only when the president has established political mastery over the assembly, as until recently in Mexico, does the assembly cease to be a significant player. Second, to the extent that Latin American presidents continually anticipate legislative reactions, their strategies vary depending on the type of legislature they face. But Latin American executives have a unique combination of institutional powers, with both unilateral abilities (such as some forms of decree) and integrative abilities (such as urgency motions). Depending on the lay of the political land, they can choose either to make an end run around the assembly or to join it. In either case, they can go much further than an American president, thus producing a distinctive oscillation in Latin American executive-legislative relations. Third, Latin American executives' combination of first-mover status with a distinctive set of institutional powers generates results, in terms of executive-legislative relations, that are often intermediate between those expected in the U.S., with its more rigorous separation of powers, and in Europe, with its more complete fusion of powers.
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